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Abstract
In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [6] model with aggregate
uncertainty, we show that there exists an equilibrium with the fol-
lowing properties: all consumers deposit at the bank, all patient con-
sumers wait for the last period to withdraw, and the bank fails with
strictly positive probability. Furthermore, we show that the probabil-
ity of a bank failure remains bounded away from zero as the number
of consumers increases. We interpret such an equilibrium as reflecting
a bank run, defined as an episode in which a large number of people
withdraw their deposits from a bank, forcing it to fail.
Our results show that we can have equilibrium bank runs with
consumers poorly informed about the true state of nature, a sequen-
tial service constraint, an infinite marginal utility of consumption at
zero, and without consumers’ panic and sunspots. We therefore think
that aggregate risk in Diamond-Dybvig-like environments can be an
important element to explain bank runs.
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, we observe many episodes of a large number of people
withdrawing their deposits from a bank, forcing it to fail. Since the work
of Diamond and Dybvid [6], these bank run1 episodes are understood as a
consequence of an illiquid banking system: the main function of banks is to
lend long and to borrow short, thus yielding an illiquid asset structure; this
in turn creates the potential for bank runs.
Recently, Green and Lin [10, 11] have challenged this view, by showing
that bank runs can be eliminated when banks use more sophisticated con-
tracts in a Diamond and Dybvig environment. Thus, they conclude that the
lack of liquidity highlighted by Diamond and Dybvig does not necessarily
leads to bank runs. Green and Lin’s result then gave rise to the view that
the Diamond and Dybvig model is not appropriate to explain bank runs.
The main goal of our paper is to provide theoretical support for the
Diamond and Dybvig model. Some support has already been given by Peck
and Shell [16], who have shown that bank runs can occur due to sunspots
in equilibrium under the optimal contract, even when banks are allowed to
offer contracts similar to those in Green and Lin [11]. We provide additional
support by showing that bank runs can occur with positive probability in
equilibrium as a consequence of aggregate uncertainty and poorly informed
consumers. Furthermore, we show that the probability of bank runs remains
bounded away from zero as the size of the economy increases. This will allow
us to conclude that the positive probability of bank runs is mainly driven
by the desire to provide better risk sharing and more liquidity to consumers.
Thus, bank runs in our framework are directly related with liquidity.
Our results also show that bank runs can be generated in the presence of
many elements that make them costly to consumers and/or difficult to occur
in equilibrium. These include:
1We follow Allen and Gale [2, p. 1245] in defining the notion of a bank run:
“From the earliest times, banks have been plagued by the problem of bank
runs in which many or all of the bank’s depositors attempt to withdraw their
funds simultaneously.”
In particular, we will classify as a bank run an episode in which many depositors withdraw
(enough to make the bank fail) regardless of whether or not some of them are panicking.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the terminology; for instance, Peck and Shell [17]
refer to the episodes we call bank runs as “no-run rationing” or “running out of funds”.
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1. absence of consumers’ panic,
2. absence of sunspots,
3. absence of mixed strategies,
4. sequential service constraint (and so zero consumption to late with-
drawers),
5. an infinite marginal utility of consumption at zero,
6. absence of information about the true state of the economy,
7. recoverability of investment in the productive technology, and
8. a non-negligible probability of a high fraction of impatient consumers
occurring.
This suggests that bank runs are quite robust in our Diamond and Dybvig
framework.
Before we discuss each of the above elements and the reason why they
cause difficulties, we will present our results in more detail. We consider an
environment similar to the one in Diamond and Dybvig [6]. In particular,
consumers can be of two distinct types: impatient consumers, who need to
consume early, and patient consumers, willing to postpone consumption. In
contrast with them, we assume that there is a finite number of consumers.
We assume that there is aggregate uncertainty, modelled in the following way:
first, the probability of each consumer being impatient is chosen according
to a continuous density function; then, the consumers’ type is determined in
an i.i.d. way. As in Diamond and Dybvig, the consumers’ type is their own
private information. Furthermore, we assume that although each consumer
knows his type, he does not know the true value of the probability of each
consumer being impatient.
Consumers can deposit their initial endowment in a bank, or invest it
directly. The banking system is assumed to be competitive and so banks
offer contracts to depositors in order to maximize their ex-ante welfare.
Regarding the contracts that banks offer to consumers, we depart from
the optimal contracting approach of Green and Lin [10, 11], by following
their suggestion in [11, p. 24]. According to them, the incentive problems of
banking executives may be missing in their model. This may explain “(...)
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why the banking contract in [their] model is not observed and why runs
have historically occurred.” In the contract proposed by Green and Lin, the
amount paid by the bank to an early depositor depends on the information
the bank has obtained from those who have already contacted it. However,
as Green and Lin point out, if each depositor does not have access to that
information, such contract is infeasible. Following this view, we assume that
the only information depositors have, besides their own type, is whether the
bank has failed or not. Specifically, we assume that a monetary authority
makes a public announcement whenever the bank fails and so, the bank can
make payments contingent on whether it has failed (in which case it pays
nothing) or not. However, the bank cannot make payments contingent on
any other variable. Thus, we are taking Green and Lin’s suggestion to the
extreme, and, in fact, returning to the same type of contract considered
originally by Diamond and Dybvig.2 We want to emphasize that this is
an assumption on the technology to enforce contracts: although a contract
between the bank and the deposits that makes payments contingent on the
number of people who have already withdrawn can be verifiable by a third
party, we assume that those verification costs are too high to make them
efficient.
Our main result then shows that if a sufficiently high fraction of impatient
consumers is possible to occur3 and if the number of consumers is sufficiently
high, then there exists an equilibrium in which:
1. every consumer deposits,
2. no patient consumer withdraws early and,
3. the bank fails with a strictly positive probability.
In the above equilibrium, the bank failure corresponds to a situation
where the fraction of impatient consumers is high. In such a case, we would
observe a large number of depositors trying to withdraw, which would force
the bank to fail — a situation that corresponds to a bank run.
2We assume that consumers are isolated from each other, which implies the same
trading restrictions (i.e., that depositors cannot sell their position at the bank) as in
Diamond and Dybvig [6]. The importance of these trading restrictions has been analyzed
by Jacklin [14].
3i.e., if the support of density function determining the probability of each consumer
being impatient contains values sufficiently close to one.
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There is a sense in which our result above is weak: if the probability of a
consumer being impatient is positive, then the probability that all consumers
are impatient is also positive. This implies that all that is required for a
positive probability of a bank run is that the bank offers an interest rate
greater than one. Thus, the only way for the bank to avoid a bank run is to
offer a contract in which there is absolutely no risk sharing. Our second main
result strengthens the above result by showing, under the same assumptions,
that the probability of a bank run is bounded away from zero.
The probability of a bank run, and the fact that it is bounded away from
zero, depends on how illiquid the bank is. The reason is better understood
by considering large economies, in which we are mainly interested. By the
law of large numbers, as the number of consumers increases, the fraction of
impatient depositors in the population converges to the probability of each
one being impatient. In the limit, if the support of the density function
determining the probability of each consumer being impatient is [t, t¯], the
bank will fail with a positive probability whenever it offers an interest rate
higher than r¯ = 1/t¯. Thus, we can rephrase our second main result as showing
that the interest offered by the bank is higher and bounded away from r¯. The
main intuition behind it is that banks find it optimal to offer an interest rate
higher than r¯ in order to provide better risk sharing to consumers. The fact
that the interest rate offered by the bank is bounded away from r¯ then leads
to a probability of bank run that is bounded away from zero.
Regarding the main results of the paper, our inspiration came from Wal-
lace [20, p. 12], where he writes: “In my model, the cause of a bank run
and a partial suspension is exogenous — an aggregate shock to tastes that
makes the number of people wanting to withdraw unusually large.” When
we combine this insight with the simple contracting approach, we find that
the bank prefers to face a positive probability of a bank run, and a conse-
quent failure, in order to provide better risk sharing to its depositors. As
suggested by Wallace, the bank run will occur when the number of impatient
consumers is high. Our results have, nevertheless, two important differences
compared with Wallace’s: first, bank runs have more severe consequences in
our results, since they cause banks to fail, whereas in Wallace’s they lead to
a partial suspension; second, Wallace’s result relies on the assumption that
there is a small amount of aggregate risk limited to a small group of individ-
uals, which is not needed in ours — we believe that our result allows us to
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think of bank runs as a large-scale, society-wide phenomenon.4
Although our results are intuitive, they are not easy to establish. Part
of the difficulty arises because we allow for several elements that make them
hard to occur in equilibrium. First, since all patient consumers prefer to wait,
there is no consumers’ panic in the bank runs of our model, an element that
was important in Diamond and Dybvig [6] and Peck and Shell [16], among
others. Second, our results do not require sunspots, which are a crucial
element for Peck and Shell’s result. Third, we restrict consumer choice to
pure strategies; without this assumption one can show the existence of a
positive probability of a bank run as in Ada˜o and Temzelides [1]. Fourth, we
require banks to satisfy a sequential service constraint (which implies that, in
a bank run, late withdrawers will receive zero consumption). Fifth, we allow
for an infinite marginal utility of consumption at zero, which together with
the previous assumptions makes bank runs costly to those consumers who are
unable to withdraw. Sixth, we assume that consumers have no information
about the true state of the economy, and seventh, that the investment in the
productive technology can be recovered — without these two assumptions,
one can generate bank runs in which consumers run when the state of the
economy is bad, as in Allen and Gale [2]. Finally, we allow for a non-negligible
probability of a high fraction of impatient consumers occurring; this increases
the risk of a bank run, which is costly.
Furthermore, our results hold for (large, but) finite economies, and not
merely in a limit or in a continuum of agents economy. Thus, although we
infer them from the study of a limit economy, they cannot be regarded as an
artifact of an infinite population.5
In conclusion, we have shown that within the standard Diamond and
Dybvig [6] environment, bank runs can be explained as the result of ag-
gregate uncertainty, simple contracting, and without many of the elements
emphasized in the literature. Furthermore, in our framework, bank runs are
intimately linked with the consumer’s desire for liquidity, an idea expressed
originally by Diamond and Dybvig.
4See Peck and Shell [17] and Ennis and Keister [7] for a similar point.
5See Barlo and Carmona [4], Carmona [5] and Meirowitz [15] for more on this issue.
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2 The model
In this section, we formally describe the model. The model presented here is
similar to that presented in Diamond and Dybvig [6].
There are three periods T = 0, 1, 2. There is a single consumption good.
There are two technologies: first, the consumer good can be stored from one
period to the other; the gross rate of return equals 1. Second, there is a
productive technology, by which one unit invested in period 0 yields R, with
R > 1, units of consumption in period 2; furthermore, if the investment is
interrupted in period 1, it will yield one unit (i.e., the investment can be
recovered).
There is a finite number of consumers denoted by n ∈ N. All consumers
are identical in period 0. Consumers receive an endowment of one unit of
consumption good in period 0 and zero in the remaining periods.
Each consumer can be of two distinct types, denoted by type 1 and type
2. A type 1 consumer values consumption in period 1 only (impatient con-
sumer), whereas a type 2 consumer values consumption only in period 2
(patient consumer).
In period 1, nature draws a type for every consumer in the following way:
first, a number in t ∈ [0, 1] is drawn according to a probability measure µ;
then each consumer’s type is drawn in an i.i.d. way with a probability t of
being of type 1. It follows that the fraction of impatient consumers equals
i ∈ Sn = {k/n : k = 0, . . . , n} with probability pn,t(i) = tni(1 − t)n−ni when
there are n consumers and the probability of each being a type 1 is t.
Each consumer knows his own type, but not the type of the others; i.e.,
consumers’ type is their own private information. Furthermore, no consumer
knows the realized value of t.
We make the following assumptions on the uncertainty:
Assumption 1 1. The support of µ is an interval contained in [0, t′],
where 0 < t′ ≤ 1;
2. there exists a continuous function f : supp(µ)→ R+ such that µ(B) =∫
B
f for every Borel measurable set B ⊆ [0, 1].
The continuity of the density f implies that if t¯ = max{t : t ∈ supp(µ)},
then F (t) =
∫ t
0
f < 1 for all t < t¯. Given any t¯ ∈ [0, 1], we write f ∈ Ft¯,B,x
when f is continuous, bounded by B > 0, t¯ = max{t : t ∈ supp(µ)} and
x =
∫ 1
0
tf(t)dt.
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Let c1 denote the individual consumption received by a consumer in pe-
riod 1, let c2 denote individual consumption received in period 2, and let
Θ be the type of the agent. The utility derived by every agent from the
consumption of the bundle (c1, c2) is
U(c1, c2,Θ) =
{
u(c1) if Θ = 1,
u(c1 + c2) otherwise,
(1)
where u : R+ → R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave. Furthermore, we assume:
Assumption 2 1. −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 for c ≥ 1;
2. u(0) = 0;
3. limc→0 u′(c)c ∈ R.
Every agent is assumed to maximize the ex-ante (relative to period 0) ex-
pected utility E[U(c1, c2,Θ)].
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We next describe the banking industry. There is a representative bank
behaving competitively. The bank offers to the depositors a contract speci-
fying a fixed claim of r per unit deposited to agents withdrawing in period
1. The bank is mutually owned, and it is liquidated in period 2. This im-
plies that period 2 withdrawers will share the remainder of the bank’s assets
equally among themselves.
If and when the bank fails, consumers will be informed (say, by a regula-
tory entity). The bank is closed and the remaining assets are distributed in
period 2 to those claiming it. We assume that no impatient consumer will
claim anything in period 2; in any case, an impatient consumer is indifferent
between claiming or not, and so we can justify this assumption by postulating
a positive cost of exercising it.
6An example of a function satisfying all the above assumptions is u(c) = − exp−2c+1.
In this case, we would have limc→0 u′(c) = 2. An example of a function satisfying
limc→0 u′(c) =∞ is
u(c) =
{ √
c if c ≤ 1/2,
−
√
2c−1
4 +
√
2 otherwise.
(2)
This function satisfies all the assumptions except that it does not have a second derivative
at 1/2. Nevertheless, all our results extend to the case in which u′′ is continuous for all
c ≥ 1.
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Thus, the amounts received by depositors are as follows: Let A denote
the total amount deposited in period 0 and r be the interest rate offered by
the bank. Consider a depositor j willing to withdraw in period 1 and let
fj denote the number of withdrawers arriving at the bank before consumer
j. Then j’s period 1 payoff is equal to r if rfj ≤ A and 0 otherwise. If a
depositor waits for period 2 to withdraw, then he receives
max
{
R(A− rf)
1− f , 0
}
, (3)
where f denotes the fraction of the depositors who have withdrawn in period
1.
We assume that consumers are isolated from each other during period
1, although each one contacts the bank at some point in that period. As
Wallace [19] has shown, this implies that the bank has to satisfy a sequential
service constraint; that is, the bank must serve the depositors withdrawing
in period 1 in the (random) order that they arrive at the bank until it runs
out of assets. We assume that all orderings are equally likely, and so each
occurs with a probability of 1/m! when there are 0 ≤ m ≤ n withdrawers.
In order to evaluate different strategies, each consumer needs to know the
probability of arriving at the bank before it fails. If the bank can fully pay
k depositors, then the probability that a given consumer is fully paid equals
min{1, k(m − 1)!/m!} = min{1, k/m}. We will write this probability as
α(m/n, k/n), that is, we use as arguments the fraction of depositors trying
to withdraw and the fraction of depositors that can be fully paid in period 1.
In general, this probability depends on the interest rate r offered by the bank
and on the strategies chosen by the other consumers. We let kn(r) satisfy
rkn(r) ≤ 1 and r(kn(r) + 1/n) > 1; thus, nkn(r) is the number of depositors
that can be fully paid in period 1 when the bank offers r.
A strategy of the bank is the choice of r ∈ [1, R]; the bank chooses r
in order to maximize ex-ante utility of the consumers (recall that they are
equal ex-ante). This behavior is motivated by the competitive nature of the
banking industry.7 More generally, we could assume that the bank offers
r ∈ R, but risk-aversion will ensure that r ∈ [1, R]. The bank chooses the
interest rate in period 0 and then announces it to the consumers.
7Ada˜o and Temzelides [1] have shown in a similar framework that another type of bank’s
behavior is possible in equilibrium; however, bank’s maximization of the ex-ante utility of
the consumers is the only behavior plausible in more refined notions of equilibrium.
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In period 0, each consumer will choose whether to deposit given the in-
terest rate offered by the bank; those that do not deposit will invest in the
productive technology. For simplicity, we assume that consumers have to
deposit all of the endowment. In period 1 each consumer learns her type
and then chooses either to withdraw from the bank or to wait, depending
on her type, on the interest rate and on her deposit choice. Consumers that
withdraw their deposit in period 1 can either consume the goods received or
store them.8 Hence, a strategy for a consumer is (d, w), where d is a function
from [1, r] into {0, 1}, and w is a function from [1, R]×{0, 1}×Θ into {0, 1}.
We make the convention that d(r) = 1 stands for the choice of depositing,
and similarly w(r, d,Θ) = 1 means that she will withdraw in period 1.9
A symmetric equilibrium is then r∗, d∗, and w∗ such that w∗(r, d,Θ) is
optimal for all (r, d,Θ), d∗(r) is optimal for all r, and r∗ is optimal taking as
given agents’ strategies.
The bank fails in the first period if d∗(r∗) = 1 and 1 < r∗m/n where r∗ is
an equilibrium interest rate and m is the number of depositors that choose
to withdraw (i.e., w∗(r∗, 1,Θ) = 1). That is, the total value of assets that
depositors plan to withdraw in period 1 strictly exceeds the total value of
assets owned by the bank, also in period 1.
We say that an equilibrium bank run without consumers’ panic occurs
asymptotically with positive probability if there exists N ∈ N such that n ≥ N
implies the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with the following proper-
ties:
1. every consumer deposits (i.e., d∗(r∗) = 1),
2. all patient consumers wait (i.e., w∗(r∗, d∗(r∗), 2) = 0),
3. the bank fails in the first period with strictly positive probability.
In the above equilibrium there is a bank run in the sense that a large
number of depositors go to the bank, causing it to fail. However, since all
patient consumers prefer to wait, we say that there is no consumers’ panic.
8This implies that storage will only be helpful for patient consumers who withdraw
early.
9Note that we only allow pure strategies. It is important to note that it is possible to
have bank runs in a mixed strategy equilibrium, as shown by Ada˜o and Temzelides [1].
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3 Equilibrium Bank Runs
In this section, we study whether equilibrium bank runs exist and how robust
they are. In Section 3.1, we give a sufficient condition that guarantees the ex-
istence of equilibrium bank runs with positive probability in large economies.
Then, in Section 3.2, we show that under the same assumption, the proba-
bility of bank runs is bounded away from zero as the number of consumers
increases.
3.1 Existence of Equilibrium Bank Runs
In an equilibrium bank run, all consumers choose to deposit and patient
consumers prefer to wait. So, it is necessary to guarantee the existence of
equilibria with these properties, which one can do under the assumptions
made in Section 2.
We can construct such an equilibrium by studying a particular maximiza-
tion problem. This problem consists of choosing an interest rate r in order
to maximize consumers’ ex-ante utility among those that make consumers
prefer to deposit and impatient consumers to wait, given that everyone is
depositing and every patient depositor is waiting.
We describe this problem below which is indexed by the number of con-
sumers. The ex-ante expected utility if all follow the above strategy can be
obtained as follows: if a consumer is of type 1, then he receives r with proba-
bility α(i, kn(r)) when the fraction of impatient consumers is i and the bank
can fully pay nkn(r) consumers. If the consumer is of type 2, he receives
max{0, R(n−ri)
n−i }. Thus, letting Un(r) denote the ex-ante expected utility, we
have
Un(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)
t ∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)α
(
(n− 1)i+ 1
n
, kn(r)
)
u(r)
+(1− t)
∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)u
(
max
{
0,
R(n− r(n− 1)i)
n− (n− 1)i
}) dt.
(4)
In particular, suppose that the bank offers an interest rate equal to r, all
consumers deposit, and all patient consumers wait for the second period to
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withdraw. Then, the expected utility for a patient consumer equals∫ 1
0
f(t)
∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)u
(
max
{
0,
R(n− r(n− 1)i)
n− (n− 1)i
})
dt. (5)
If one patient consumer decides to withdraw in period 1, then his expected
utility, when all the other patient consumers withdraw in period 2, is given
by ∫ 1
0
f(t)
∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)α
(
(n− 1)i+ 1
n
, kn(r)
)
u(r)dt. (6)
Thus, letting
Wn = {r ∈ [1, R] : WLn(r) ≥ WRn(r)} , (7)
where WLn(r) is defined by equation (5) and WRn(r) by equation (6), we
have that any patient consumer will choose to withdraw in period 2 provided
that r belongs to W , all consumers deposits, and all other patient consumers
wait for period 2 to withdraw.
If a consumer decides not to deposit, then his ex-ante expected utility is
simply ∫ 1
0
f(t) [tu(1) + (1− t)u(R)] dt, (8)
which is equal to Un(1). Hence, letting
Dn = {r ∈ [1, R] : Un(r) ≥ Un(1)} , (9)
we see that any consumer will choose to deposit provided that r belongs to
D, all other consumers deposit, and all patient consumers wait for period 2
to withdraw.
Thus, consider the following problem:
max
r∈[1,R]
Un(r)
subject to r ∈ Wn ∩Dn,
(10)
One can show that this problem has a solution (see Lemma 11 in the Ap-
pendix). It is then easy to construct an equilibrium in which all consumers
deposit and all patient consumers wait (see Lemma 12).
Although the existence of such equilibria is necessary for our purposes, it
is not enough. Without further assumptions, the interest rate offered by the
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bank in such equilibria may be equal to one, in which case there will be no
bank run. Thus, we need additional assumptions in order to guarantee that
bank runs occur with positive probability. Essentially, we need the support
of f to have values sufficiently close to one, and a large population.
Proposition 1 For every B > 0 and x ∈ (0, 1) there exists τ ∈ [0, 1] such
that if τ < t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x then an equilibrium bank run without
consumers’ panic occurs asymptotically with positive probability.
One crucial element needed for Proposition 1 is a large population. By the
law of large numbers, the fraction of impatient consumers in the population
converges to the probability of each consumer being impatient as the size
of the population increases. This implies that in the limit there is only one
source of aggregate uncertainty, which is the one represented by f . This is
in contrast with what happens in any finite economy, where some aggregate
uncertainty stems from the consumers’ idiosyncratic preference shocks. This
is important partly because the probability that the fraction of impatient
consumers is between t¯ and 1 is always positive in any finite economy, but is
zero in the limit.
The above comment suggests that the analysis of a limit problem where
the law of large numbers holds might be useful and easier. In the Appendix
A.1 we show that problem (10) converges, in the sense that all the functions
involved converge uniformly, to the following problem:
max
r∈[1,R]
U(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)
[
tα(t, k(r))u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})]
dt
subject to r ∈ W ∩D,
(11)
where k(r) = 1/r, D = {r ∈ [1, R] : U(r) ≥ U(1)} and
W =
{
r ∈ [1, R] :
∫ 1
0
f(t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})
dt ≥
∫ 1
0
f(t)α(t, k(r))u(r)dt
}
.
(12)
In this problem, the variable t can be thought of as the fraction of impa-
tient consumers in the population. In this way, it is very similar to the one
considered initially by Diamond and Dybvig [6].
The analysis of the limit problem above reveals that its solution exceeds
r¯ = 1/t¯, provided that t¯ is sufficiently close to 1. This allows us to conclude
that the solution to problem (10) is also greater than r¯ if the population is
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large enough, leading directly to a positive probability of bank runs. This
reasoning illustrates why we need the support of f to have values sufficiently
close to one.
3.2 A Limit Result on the Probability of Bank Runs
As we have pointed out above, there are two sources of aggregate uncertainty
in a finite economy. This implies that there are two reasons for having
a positive probability of bank runs whenever the bank offers an interest
rate greater than 1. First, for any possible t > 0, the probability that the
fraction of impatient consumers is greater than 1/r is always positive — this
probability has to do with the distribution associated with pn,t. A second
reason has to do with the distribution associated with f and which can also
(by the law of large numbers) be thought of as representing the probability
that the fraction of impatient consumers is greater than 1/r.
Clearly, the second effect alluded to above can only take place if r exceeds
r¯. If this is not the case, then the probability of bank runs is essentially
due only to the consumers’ idiosyncratic shocks, and would vanish as the
population size increases. What Proposition 2 below shows is that this is not
the case: in fact, it shows that part of a positive probability of bank runs
comes from the desire to provide a better risk sharing, which is expressed in
an interest rate greater and bounded away from r¯.
We now turn to Proposition 2. Under the conditions of Proposition 1,
we know that asymptotically there exist equilibrium bank runs. For every n
sufficiently large, let (r∗n, d
∗
n, w
∗
n) be an equilibrium in which there is a bank
run without consumers’ panic. Let γn be the corresponding probability of a
bank run.
Proposition 2 The sequence {γn}n is bounded away from 0.
At this point we can provide an easy illustration of why it is necessary
that the support of f has values sufficiently close to one: if R = 2 and
t¯ = 1/3, then r¯ = 3 > R. Thus, an upper bound for γn is obtained when the
bank offers rn = R for all n, which we denote by γ˜n. It follows easily from
the law of large numbers that in this case γ˜n converges to zero. Thus, we
need r¯ to be large.
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4 Concluding Remarks
We used the standard Diamond and Dybvig [6] framework to show that bank
runs can be explained as the result of aggregate uncertainty and without
many of the elements emphasized in the literature. In our version of the
Diamond and Dybvig framework, bank runs will occur whenever there is a
large number of depositors in need of short-term funds. Such bank runs are
possible because banks will choose to offer a high short-term interest rate in
order to provide better risk sharing for their depositors; however, the interest
rate offered is so high that it leads to a positive probability that the bank will
not have enough funds to pay all early withdrawers. Hence, the above bank
runs are a direct consequence of the degree of banks’ liquidity. Furthermore,
our construction is such that the probability of a bank run is sufficiently
small to guarantee that those who do not need funds early will prefer not
to withdraw early. We thus depart from the idea that in a bank run some
depositors withdraw when they do not need — this is the sense in which such
runs involve no consumers’ panic.
The type of equilibria on which we concentrate reflects some practical
features of the banking system: banks offer liquidity and risk sharing to
depositors, people deposit and withdraw only when they have to, and some-
times banks fail. Furthermore, an equilibrium of this type has the property of
having no consumer panic, and still bank runs occur with a positive, bounded
away from zero, probability.
Although not explicitly modelled, we interpret the aggregate uncertainty
over the number of early withdrawers as reflecting business cycle conditions.
For instance, we expect the number of people who need short-term funding
to be influenced by the unemployment rate — this will be the case as long
as unemployed individuals try to compensate the loss of income by using
their assets to smooth out consumption. We then expect that fundamental
shocks that lead to a large number of early withdrawers can create bank
runs. Therefore, our results are consistent with the business cycle view of
bank runs, a view that has received some empirical support (see Gorton [9]
and Kaminsky and Reinhart [12]). This suggests that explicitly introducing
the type of fundamental shocks studied in the business cycle literature might
be promising, a challenge we take up in Amaral and Carmona [3].
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we will prove our results. In Section A.1, and following
Hildenbrand [13], we will start by showing that problem (10) converges to
the type of problem studied by Diamond and Dybvig [6] as the number of
consumers goes to infinity. Although we are interested in finite economies,
the latter problem is interesting because it is easy to study. This is essentially
because the law of large numbers holds.
In Section A.2, we study the limit problem. The main result there
(Lemma 7) shows that the interest rate offered by the bank is sufficiently
high to allow for bank runs in the limit problem under certain conditions.10
The main difficulty regarding this result has to do with the possibility that
the marginal utility of consumption is not bounded above; therefore, much
of the effort is devoted to showing that standard limit results, such as the
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem is still applicable.
In Section A.3, we show that for every n ∈ N (n denotes the population
size) there exists an equilibrium in which all consumers deposit at the bank
and all patient consumers wait to withdraw. Finally, and under the same
conditions as in Lemma 7, we show in Section A.4 that there is a positive
probability of an equilibrium bank run in large finite economies; furthermore,
we show in Section A.5 that such a probability of an equilibrium bank run
remains bounded away from zero as the number of consumers increases.
A.1 The Limit Problem
Lemma 1 For any continuous function h : [α, β]× [a, b] → R, with [a, b] ⊆
[0, 1], ∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)→ h(r, t)
uniformly in r and t.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Since h is continuous in [α, β]× [a, b], a compact set,
h is bounded. Let B > ε be such that |h| ≤ B and let δ > 0 be such that
|x−y| < δ implies that |h(x)−h(y)| < ε/2. Then, since pn,t(Bδ(t)) ≥ 1− t(1−t)nδ2
10For an illustration of the idea of Lemma 7, see the last column of Table 1 in Ennis
and Keister [7].
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(see Freund [8, p. 190]), it follows that∣∣∣∣∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)− h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫
Bδ(t)
hdpn,t − pn,t(Bδ(t))h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Bcδ(t)
hdpn,t − pn,t(Bcδ(t))h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤(
1− t(1− t)
nδ2
)
ε
2
+
t(1− t)
nδ2
2B ≤(
1− 1
4nδ2
)
ε
2
+
1
4nδ2
2B < ε,
(13)
if n is sufficiently large. Thus, sup(r,t) |
∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)− h(r, t)| ≤ ε for n
sufficiently large, which completes the proof.
Lemma 2 Let h and hn, for all n ∈ N, be real-valued functions on [α, β]×
[a, b], with [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1], satisfying h is continuous and hn converges uni-
formly to h. Then, ∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)→ h(r, t)
uniformly on r and t.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Then, since∣∣∣∣∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)−
∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
[a,b]
|hn−h|dpn,t ≤ sup
(r,i)
|hn(r, i)−h(r, i)|,
(14)
it follows by lemma 1 that∣∣∣∣∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)− h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)−
∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)
∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)− h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣ < ε, (15)
if n is sufficiently large. Thus, sup(r,t) |
∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i) − h(r, t)| ≤ ε for
n sufficiently large, which completes the proof.
Define for t, i ∈ [0, 1].
V 1n (r, i) = α
(
i+
1− i
n
, kn(r)
)
u(r), (16)
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and
V 2n (r, i) = u
(
max
{
0,
R
(
1− r (1− 1
n
)
i
)
1− (1− 1
n
)
i
})
. (17)
Also let k(r) = 1/r,
V 1(r, i) = α(i, k(r))u(r), (18)
and
V 2(r, i) = u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− ri)
1− i
})
. (19)
Lemma 3 1. kn(r) converges to k(r) uniformly;
2. α(i+(1− i)/n, kn(r)) converges to α(i, k(r)) uniformly in i ∈ [0, 1] and
r ∈ [1, R];
3. tV 1n (r, i)+(1−t)V 2n (r, i) converges uniformly to tV 1(r, i)+(1−t)V 2(r, i)
in i ∈ [0, 1− ε] and r ∈ [1, R] for all ε > 0;
4. (r, i) 7→ tV 1(r, i) + (1− t)V 2(r, i) is continuous when i ∈ [0, 1− ε] and
r ∈ [1, R] for all ε > 0 and t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. 1. We have that
k(r)− 1
n
≤ kn(r) ≤ k(r), (20)
which implies that |kn(r) − k(r)| ≤ 1/n and so, kn(r) converges uniformly
to k(r). Equation (20) can be established as follows: if kn(r) > k(r), then
rkn(r) > rk(r) = 1, a contradiction; if kn(r) < k(r) + 1/n, then r(kn(r) +
1/n) < rk(r) = 1, a contradiction.
2. We start by noting the following fact: if (r, i) 7→ an(r, i) converges
uniformly (in i and r) to (r, i) 7→ a(r, i), (r, i) 7→ bn(r, i) converges uniformly
to (r, i) 7→ b(r, i), both a and b are bounded and b and bn are bounded away
from zero (i.e., there is η > 0 such that b(r, i) ≥ η and bn(r, i) ≥ η for all
(r, i) and all n), then an/bn converges uniformly to a/b.
Suppose that i ≥ 1/r. Then α(i, k(r)) = 1/(ri) and since k(r) ≥ kn(r)
and i+(1− i)/n ≥ i, it follows that α(i+(1− i)/n, kn(r)) = kn(r)/(i+(1−
i)/n). In order to apply the above fact, let an(r, i) = kn(r), a(r, i) = 1/r,
bn(r, i) = i + (1 − i)/n and b(r, i) = i. Since all the conditions are satisfied
(in particular, bn(r, i) ≥ b(r, i) ≥ 1/R), it follows that sup(r,i):ri≥1 |α(i+ (1−
i)/n, kn(r))− α(i, k(r))| converges to zero.
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Finally, suppose that i < 1/r. Then, k(r) = 1 and so
|α(i+ (1− i)/n, kn(r))− α(i, k(r))| = 1−min
{
1,
kn(r)
i+ 1−i
n
}
≤
1− kn(r)
1 + 1/n
≤ 1− k(r)− 1/n
1 + 1/n
= 1− 1− 1/n
1 + 1/n
.
(21)
Thus, sup(r,i):ri<1 |α(i+ (1− i)/n, kn(r))−α(i, k(r))| → 0. Hence, α(i+ (1−
i)/n, kn(r)) converges to α(i, k(r)) uniformly in r and i.
3. It follows from part 2 that V 1n (r, i) converges uniformly to V
1(r, i).
It remains to show that V 2n (r, i) converges uniformly to V
2(r, i) if r ∈
[1, R] and i ∈ [0, 1− ε], with ε > 0. Define
βn(r, i) = max
{
0,
R(1− r(1− 1
n
)i)
1− (1− 1
n
)i
}
and
β(r, i) = max
{
0,
R(1− ri)
1− i
}
.
Since βn(1, i) = β(1, i) = R, we may assume that r > 1. Note also that
βn(r, i) ≥ β(r, i).
If i ≤ 1/r then β(r, i) ≥ 0, and we readily see that all the conditions
of the fact in part 2 of this proof are satisfied: let a(r, i) = R(1 − ri),
an(r, i) = R(1− ri(1− 1/n)), b(r, i) = 1− i and bn(r, i) = 1− i(1− 1/n); in
particular bn ≥ b ≥ ε.
If i > 1/r, then β(r, i) = 0 and since βn(r, i) is decreasing in i, we obtain
|βn(r, i)− β(r, i)| ≤
R(1− r(1− 1
n
)1
r
)
1− (1− 1
n
)1
r
≤ R 1/n
1− 1/r ≤
R
εn
→ 0.
(22)
Thus, βn(r, i) converges uniformly to β(r, i). Since u is continuous, then
V 2n (r, i) converges uniformly to V
2(r, i).
4. Obvious.
Let
U(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)
[
tα(t, k(r))u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})]
dt,
(23)
and k(r) = 1/r.
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Lemma 4 Let B > 0, x ∈ (0, 1), 0 < t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x. Then, Un(r)
converges uniformly to U(r).
Proof. We may write
Un(r) =
∫ t¯
0
f(t)Vn(r, t)dt, (24)
where
Vn(r, t) =
∫ 1
0
(
tV 1n (r, i) + (1− t)V 2n (r, i)
)
dpn−1,t(i). (25)
We may also define
V (r, t) = tα(t, k(r))u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})
and write U(r) =
∫ t¯
0
f(t)V (r, t)dt. Thus, in order to prove the lemma, it is
enough to show that Vn converges uniformly to V for r ∈ [1, R] and t ∈ [0, t¯].
Let 0 < η < 1− t¯. Then,
|Vn(r, t)−V (r, t)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t¯+η
0
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)− V (r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
t¯+η
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)
∣∣∣∣ .
(26)
Since pn−1,t(Bη(t)) ≥ 1− t(1−t)(n−1)η2 (see Freund [8, p. 190]), we have that∣∣∣∣∫ 1
t¯+η
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ u(R)pn−1,t([t¯+ η, 1]) ≤
u(R)pn−1,t([0, t− η] ∪ [t+ η, 1]) ≤ u(R) t(1− t)
(n− 1)η2 ≤ u(R)
1
4(n− 1)η2 .
(27)
Since u(R)/[4(n − 1)η2] converges to zero and is independent of r and t, it
remains to show that ∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t¯+η
0
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)− V (r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣
converges to zero uniformly. This follows from Lemma 2 and 3.
Let
WL(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})
dt (28)
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and
WR(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)α(t, k(r))u(r)dt. (29)
Lemma 5 Let B > 0, x ∈ (0, 1), 0 < t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x. Then, WLn(r)
converges uniformly to WL(r) and WRn(r) converges uniformly to WR(r).
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 4.
A.2 Analysis of the Limit Problem
Let D = {r ∈ [1, R] : U(r) ≥ U(1)} and W = {r ∈ [1, R] : WL(r) ≥
WR(r)}.
Lemma 6 The function U has a maximizer in D ∩W .
Proof. Note that the set D ∩W is compact, and non-empty, since r = 1
belongs to D ∩ W . The function U is a continuous function of r. Hence,
there exists r∗ that maximizes U in D ∩W .
Lemma 7 For all B > 0 and x ∈ (0, 1), there is τ ∈ [0, 1] such that if
τ < t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x the following holds:
There exists r˜ > 1/t¯ such that U(r˜) > U(r) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ 1/t¯ and
WL(r˜) > WR(r˜).
Lemma 7 is the key lemma to establish Proposition 1. Before presenting
its proof, we need some technical lemmas.
Lemma 8
∫ r
0
u′ = u(r) for any r > 0.
Proof. Let 0 < δ < r. Then
∫ r
δ
u′ = u′(r) − u′(δ) (see Wheeden and
Zygmund [21, Theorem 5.52, p.83] and Rudin [18, Theorem 6.21, p. 134]).
Define hk = χ[1/k,r]u
′ for all k ∈ N. Since hk ≥ 0 for all k, and hk ↗ u′, it
follows that
∫ r
0
hk →
∫ r
0
u′. Hence,
∫ r
0
u′ = limk[u(r)−u(1/k)] = u(r)−u(0) =
u(r).
Let g(r, t) = R(1−rt)
1−t .
Lemma 9
∫ 1/r
0
u′(g(r, t))dt =
∫ R
0
u′(y) R(r−1)
(Rr−y)2dy for all r > 1.
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Proof. We start by noting the following extension of the change of vari-
able theorem (Rudin [18, Theorem 6.19, p. 132]): if γ : [A,B] → [b, a] is a
strictly decreasing continuous function with γ′ Riemann integrable and h is
Riemann integrable on [b, a], then
∫ a
b
h(x)dx =
∫ B
A
(−γ′(y))h(γ(y))dy.
Let 0 < δ < 1/r. Let γ(y) = R−y
Rr−y . Then −γ(y) = R(r−1)(Rr−y)2 , and is
therefore bounded by 1/R(r − 1). Thus, by the above,∫ δ
0
u′ ◦ g(r, t)dt =
∫ R
R(1−rδ)
1−δ
u′(y)
R(r − 1)
(Rr − y)2dy. (30)
Using an argument similar to that in Lemma 8, we can show that∫ 1/r
0
u′(g(r, t))dt = lim
δ→1/r
∫ δ
0
u′(g(r, t))dt =
∫ R
0
u′(y)
R(r − 1)
(Rr − y)2dy. (31)
We can now proceed with the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7. Since WL(1) = u(R) > u(1) = WR(1), then
there exists ζ > 0 such that 1 < r < 1 + ζ implies WL(r) > WR(r).
Let f be such that
∫ 1
0
tf(t)dt = x. Consider the following function M :
[0, 1]→ R defined by
M(r) =
∫ 1
0
[u′(r)−Ru′(g(r, t))]tf(t)dt. (32)
Clearly, M(1) = [u′(1) − Ru′(R)] ∫ 1
0
tf(t)dt = [u′(1) − Ru′(R)]x and so
M(1) > 0 (see Diamond and Dybvig [6, footnote 2]).
Let {t¯k}k ⊂ (0, 1) be such that limk t¯k = 1 and {fk} be a sequence of
densities belonging to Ft¯k,B,x, but otherwise arbitrary. Let r¯k = 1/t¯k, for all
k.
Claim 1 limk
∫ 1
0
[u′(r¯k)−Ru′(g(r¯k, t))]tfk(t)dt = [u′(1)−Ru′(R)]x.
Proof. Since u′ is continuous, we have that u′(r¯k)x → u′(1)x; thus, it
remains to show that
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)tfk(t)dt → xu′(R). Note that xu′(R) =∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(1, t)tfk(t)dt for all k. We have that u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)tfk(t) ≥ u′(R) for all
t ∈ [0, t¯k] and so∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)tfk(t)dt−
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(1, t)tfk(t)dt
∣∣∣∣
≤ B
∫ 1
0
(u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)− u′ ◦ g(1, t))χ[0,t¯k]dt.
(33)
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Since
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(1, t))χ[0,t¯k]dt→ u′(R) =
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(1, t)dt, it is enough to show
that ∫ t¯k
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt =
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)χ[0,t¯k]dt→
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(1, t)dt.
Clearly, 0 ≤ u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)χ[0,t¯k] → u′ ◦ g(1, t). Let ε > 0. Then, by the
bounded convergence theorem (Wheeden and Zygmund [21, Corollary 5.37,
p. 76])
∫ 1−ε
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt→ u′(R)(1− ε). By Lemma 9, for k large,∫ 1
1−ε
u′◦g(r¯k, t)χ[0,t¯k]dt =
∫ t¯k
1−ε
u′◦g(r¯k, t)dt =
∫ R(1−r¯k+εr¯k)/ε
0
u′(y)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − y)2dy.
(34)
We have that∫ R(1−r¯k+εr¯k)/ε
0
u′(y)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − y)2dy ≤
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − 1)2
∫ 1
0
u′(y)dy + u′(1)R(r¯k − 1)
∫ R(1−r¯k+εr¯k)/ε
1
1
(Rr¯k − y)2dy =
u(1)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − 1)2 + u
′(1)
[
R(r¯k − 1)
Rr¯k −R(1− r¯k + εr¯k)/ε −
R(r¯k − 1)
Rr¯k − 1
]
=
u(1)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − 1)2 + u
′(1)
[
ε− R(r¯k − 1)
Rr¯k − 1
]
→k→∞
εu′(1).
(35)
Thus,
u′(R) ≤ lim inf
k
∫ t¯k
0
u′◦g(r¯k, t)dt ≤ lim sup
k
∫ t¯k
0
u′◦g(r¯k, t)dt ≤ εu′(1)+(1−ε)u′(R),
(36)
and so limk
∫ t¯k
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt = u′(R).
Hence, it follows from claim 1 that there exists 0 < τ < 1 such that if
τ < t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x, then Mf (r¯) > Mf (1) and WL(r) > WR(r) for all
r ∈ [1, r¯].
Let t¯ ∈ (τ, 1) and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x. Note that U is concave in [0, r¯], where
r¯ = 1/t¯ as before. This follows from the fact that both u and r 7→ u◦g(r, t) are
concave for all t ∈ [0, r¯]: we have that ∂u ◦ g(r, t)/∂r = u′′ ◦ g(r, t)(tR)2/(1−
t)2 < 0.
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Claim 2 U ′(r) =M(r) for all r ∈ [1, r¯].
Proof. Let r ∈ (1, r¯] and let rk ↗ r. Then
U(rk)− U(r)
rk − r =
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
[
t
u(rk)− u(r)
rk − r + (1− t)
u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r, t)
rk − r
]
dt.
(37)
So, it is enough to show that∫ t¯
0
f(t)t
u(rk)− u(r)
rk − r dt→
∫ t¯
0
f(t)u′(r)dt,
and ∫ t¯
0
f(t)(1− t)u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r, t)
rk − r dt→
∫ t¯
0
f(t)tRu′ ◦ g(r, t)dt.
We have that {(u(rk)−u(r))/(rk−r)}k is non-negative and decreasing and
that t 7→ tf(t)(u(r1)− u(r))/(r1 − r) is integrable. The desired convergence
then follows from the monotone convergence theorem (see Wheeden and Zyg-
mung [21, Theorem 5.32, p. 75]). Similarly, {(u◦g(rk, t)−u◦g(r, t))/(rk−r)}k
is non-positive and decreasing, and so {−(u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r, t))/(rk − r)}k
is non-negative and increasing, and so the desired convergence follows also
from the monotone convergence theorem.
The case r ∈ [1, r¯) and rk ↘ r is analogous.
Since U is concave, then M is decreasing. This implies that U(r¯) ≥ U(r)
for all 1 ≤ r ≤ r¯ as follows: A necessary condition for a solution to the
problem
max
r∈[1,R]
U(r)
subject to r ∈W ∩D
and r ≤ r¯.
(38)
is that
[r − r¯]M(r) = 0; (39)
Since M(r) > 0 for all r ∈ [1, r¯], it follows that r¯ maximizes U(r) in [1, r¯].
Finally, we claim that there exists r˜ > r¯ such that U(r˜) > U(r¯) and
WL(r˜) > WR(r˜).
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Since WL(r¯) > WR(r¯), we conclude that there exists a ball B(r¯) around
r¯ such that r ∈ B(r¯) implies WL(r) > WR(r). Therefore, to prove the
existence of r˜ with the above properties, it is enough to show that
lim
r↘r¯
U(r)− U(r¯)
r − r¯ > 0. (40)
This is so, because if equation (40) holds, then it cannot be the case that
U(r)−U(r¯)
r−r¯ ≤ 0 for all r > r¯ in the ball B(r¯) around r¯. This implies the
existence of r˜ > r¯ in B(r¯) such that U(r˜)−U(r¯)
r˜−r¯ > 0; this, of course, implies
that U(r˜) > U(r¯).
We have that
U(r)− U(r¯)
r − r¯ =∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(r¯)
r − r¯ + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
r − r¯
]
f(t)dt+
1
r − r¯
∫ t¯
1/r
{t[α(t, k(r))u(r)− u(r¯)]− (1− t)u ◦ g(r¯, t)}f(t)dt.
(41)
Let {rk}k be such that rk ↘ r¯. Note that α(t, k(rk)) = 1/(trk) = tk/t,
with tk = 1/rk. Let ε > 0; if k ∈ N is sufficiently large, then we have that
|tku(rk)− tu(r¯)| < ε for all t ∈ [tk, t¯] since
|tku(rk)− tu(r¯)| ≤ tk|u(rk)− u(r¯)|+ u(r¯)|tk − t|
≤ t¯|u(rk)− u(r¯)|+ u(r¯)|tk − t¯|,
(42)
and tk → t¯. Therefore,∣∣∣∣∣ 1rk − r¯
∫ t¯
1/rk
{t[α(t, k(rk))u(rk)− u(r¯)]f(t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣∣ 1rk − r¯
∫ 1/r¯
1/rk
[tku(rk)− tu(r¯)]f(t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
ε
rk − r¯
∫ 1/r¯
1/rk
f(t)dt = ε
F (1/r¯)− F (1/rk)
r − r¯ → ε
f(1/r¯)
r¯2
.
(43)
Since ε is arbitrary, then
lim
k
1
rk − r¯
∫ t¯
1/rk
{t[α(t, k(r))u(r)− u(r¯)]f(t)dt = 0. (44)
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Also, by the fundamental theorem of calculus,
1
rk − r¯
∫ 1/r¯
1/rk
(1− t)f(t)u ◦ g(r¯, t)dt→ (1− t¯)f(t¯)u ◦ g(r¯, t¯)/r¯2 = 0, (45)
since g(r¯, t¯) = 0 and u(0) = 0. Hence, it remains to show that
lim
r↘r¯
∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(r¯)
r − r¯ + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
r − r¯
]
f(t)dt > 0. (46)
Defining
hk(t) =
{ [
tu(rk)−u(r¯)
rk−r¯ + (1− t)
u◦g(rk,t)−u◦g(r¯,t)
rk−r¯
]
f(t) if t ∈ [0, 1/rk]
0 otherwise,
(47)
we see that limk hk(t)→ [u′(r¯)−Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)]tf(t)χ[0,1/r¯). Thus, by Claim 3
and the Bounded Convergence Theorem, we obtain
lim
r↘r¯
∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(r¯)
r − r¯ + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
r − r¯
]
f(t)dt =
lim
k→∞
∫ 1
0
hk(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
[u′(r¯)−Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)]tf(t)dt =M(r¯) > 0.
(48)
Thus, it remains only to show that the sequence of functions {hk} is
bounded, which is done in the following claim.
Claim 3 There exists M ∈ R such that |hk| ≤M for all k ∈ N.
Proof. Let
h1k = t
u(rk)− u(r¯)
rk − r¯ χ[0,1/rk]
and
h2k = (1− t)
u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
rk − r¯ χ[0,1/rk].
Obviously, |hk| ≤ |h1k|+ |h2k|.
Since u is concave, then {
u(rk)− u(r¯)
rk − r¯
}
k
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increases. Thus |h1k(t)| ≤ tu′(r¯) ≤ u′(r¯).
Define
φk(t) = u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t), (49)
for t ∈ [0, 1/rk] (note that φk(t) = (rk − r¯)h2k(t)). Then,
φ′k =
R
(1− t)2 [u
′ ◦ g(r¯, t)(r¯ − 1)− u′ ◦ g(rk, t)(rk − 1)] . (50)
Since 0 < r¯ − 1 < rk − 1 and 0 < u′ ◦ g(r¯, t) < u′ ◦ g(rk, t), then φ′k < 0.
Thus, h2k(1/rk) ≤ hk(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1/rk].
Consider
|h2k(1/rk)| =
u
(
R(rk−r¯)
rk−1
)
rk − r¯ .
By the mean value theorem, we have that
|h2k(1/rk)| = u′
(
R(ck − r¯)
ck − 1
)
R(ck − r¯)
(ck − 1)2 , (51)
for r¯ ≤ c ≤ rk. Note that rk − r¯ ≤ R(rk − r¯)/(rk − 1) and so u′(rk − r¯) ≥
u′(R(rk − r¯)/(rk − 1)). Since limc→0 cu′(c) ∈ R, there exists m ∈ R such
that limk u
′(rk − r¯)(rk − r¯) ≤ m. Then, lim supk u′(R(rk − r¯)/(rk − 1)) ≤
limk u
′(rk− r¯)(rk− r¯) ≤ m; hence {|h2k(1/rk)|}, and therefore |h2k|, is bounded
by Rm/(r¯ − 1).
This completes the proof.
A.3 Existence of a Non-Autarkic Equilibrium with a
Finite Number of Consumers
In this section we establish the existence of an equilibrium in which all con-
sumers deposit at the bank.
Lemma 10 For any n, Un is upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Note that
kn(r) =

1 if r = 1
n−j
n
if n
n−j+1 < r ≤ nn−j , j = 1, . . . , n− 1
0 if r > n
(52)
Thus, kn is upper semi-continuous, and so is Un.
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Lemma 11 The program
max
r∈[1,R]
Un(r)
subject to r ∈Wn ∩Dn,
(53)
has a solution.
Proof. Let Ij = [
n
n−j+1 ,
n
n−j ] for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, In = [n,∞) and
I0 = {1}. For each j = 0, . . . , n, consider the following problem, denoted P j:
max
r
U jn(r) = EtEi
[
n− j
(n− 1)i+ 1u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
R(n− r(n− 1)i
n− (n− 1)i
})]
subject to r ∈ Ij ∩W jn ∩Dn,
(54)
where
W jn = {r ∈ [1, R] : WL(r) ≥
n− j
(n− 1)i+ 1u(r)}, (55)
for j = 1, . . . , n and W 0n = Wn. Let S be the set of those js for which the
constraint set is non-empty; the set S is non-empty since 1 ∈ I1 ∩W 0n ∩Dn
and so 0 ∈ S. Then, if j ∈ S, the above problem has a solution, since
the objective function is upper semi-continuous, and the constraint set is
compact. Let r∗j be a solution to P
j.
Since Un jumps down if (and only if) r ∈ {1, nn−1 , nn−2 , . . . , n}, it follows
that n
n−j is a solution to P
j, j > 0 then U j−1n (r
∗
j−1) ≥ U j−1n ( nn−j ) = Un( nn−j ) >
U jn(
n
n−j ). Thus, in order to find a maximum in [1, R] we can concentrate on
those js for which n
n−j is not a solution to P
j; let J be such a set. Let r∗ be
a solution to maxr∈{r∗j :j∈J} Un(r).
We claim that r∗ solves the problem (53). Letting I˜j = ( nn−j+1 ,
n
n−j ] for
j = 1, . . . , n − 1, I˜n = (n,∞) and I˜0 = {1}, we can separate it into the
following problems, denoted P˜ j:
max
r
U jn(r) = EtEi
[
n− j
(n− 1)i+ 1u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
R(n− r(n− 1)i
n− (n− 1)i
})]
subject to r ∈ I˜j ∩W jn ∩Dn.
(56)
Since for j ∈ J the solution does not involve n
n−j , P˜
j has the same solutions
as P j. Hence, r∗ is a solution to program (53).
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Lemma 12 For all n, there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all con-
sumers deposit.
Proof. The strategies are: the bank offers r∗, and the consumers choose
d∗(r) =
{
1 if r ∈ Dn ∩Wn
0 otherwise,
(57)
w∗(r, d, 2) =
{
0 if r ∈ Dn ∩Wn and d = 1
1 otherwise,
(58)
and w∗(r, d, 1) = 1 for all (r, d).
A.4 A Positive Probability of an Equilibrium Bank
Run
In this section we prove Proposition 1. By Corollary 12, there is an equilib-
rium in which all consumers deposit for all n ∈ N and all functions f .
Let τ be as in Lemma 7 and let t¯ > τ and f ∈ Ft¯. Then, there is r˜ > 1/t¯
such that U(r˜) > U(r) for all r ∈ [1, 1/t¯] and WL(r˜) > WR(r˜). Then,
by Lemmas 4 and 5, it follows that Un(r˜) > Un(r) for all r ∈ [1, 1/t¯] and
WLn(r˜) > WRn(r˜) if n is large. Thus, r
∗
n > 1/t¯. Hence, the bank fails with
a probability given by
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
 ∑
i∈Sn:i>1/r∗n
pn,t(i)
 dt > 0, (59)
since
∑
i∈Sn:i>1/r∗ pn,t(i) > 0 if t > 0.
A.5 A Limit Result on the Probability of an Equilib-
rium Bank Run
Here we prove proposition 2. First, we claim that the sequence of interest
rates is bounded away from r¯.
Claim 4 There exists ε > 0 such that r∗n ≥ r¯ + ε for all n.
29
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is a subsequence {r∗nk} such that r∗nk →
r¯. Let r˜ be as in Lemma 7. Then, Unk(r
∗
nk
) ≥ Unk(r˜) for all k and Lemma 4
imply that U(r¯) ≥ U(r˜), a contradiction.
Hence, {
i >
1
r¯ + ε
}
⊆
{
i >
1
r∗n
}
,
and so
γn =
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
 ∑
i∈Sn:i>1/r∗n
pn,t(i)
 dt ≥ ∫ t¯
0
f(t)
(∫ 1
0
χ(1/(r¯+ε),1]dpn,t
)
dt.
(60)
Let δ > 0 and g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a continuous function satisfying
g = χ(1/(r¯+ε),1] in [0, 1/(r¯ + ε)] ∪ [1/(r¯ + ε) + δ, 1]. Then,∫ t¯
0
f
(∫ 1
0
gdpn,t
)
dt→
∫ t¯
0
fg ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε) + δ). (61)
Since g ≤ χ(1/(r¯+ε),1], we obtain
lim inf
n
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
(∫ 1
0
χ(1/(r¯+ε),1]dpn,t
)
dt ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε) + δ); (62)
since this holds for all δ > 0, it follows that
lim inf
n
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
(∫ 1
0
χ(1/(r¯+ε),1]dpn,t
)
dt ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε)), (63)
by letting δ → 0. Hence,
lim inf
n
γn ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε)) > 0, (64)
as desired.
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